INTRODUCTION
We begin this Article by sharhig something about our past legal practice careers, as we believe that is so relevant to the topic that we focus on in this Article. When Michael L. Perlin was a rookie Public Defender in Trenton, New Jersey, in the early 1970s, he regularly visited the Menlo Park Diagnostic Center where some of his clients-those who had been found, in the phrase used then, to be "repetitive and compulsive" sex offenders were housed.' When Heather Ellis Cucolo CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW -VOLUME 69 -ISSUE 3 - 2019 
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judicial decisions involving sexual offender determinations reveals that, frequently, courts rely improperly on inaccurate and underdeveloped statistics as well as unverified and outdated information. This reliance, too often, underlies rulings that subject the sex offender to significant sanctions and loss of liberty. Additionally, the continuation of the testimonial script that all sex offenders are high recidivists, dangerous, compulsive, and untreatable contributes to the anti-therapeutic effect of shaming and humiliation. This narrative results in isolation, seclusion, and lack of dignity; also, it further trivializes the judicial process and violates the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence. We will consider each of these, and we will look at all of this through the filter of the Supreme Court's decision in McKune v. Lile,' a case decided sixteen years ago that is now beginning to resurface in new, critical literature that has deconstructed the case's basic fallacy in ways that we hope will stay at the forefront of this debate for the coming years.
We argue here that, in fact, the "strings in the book" are "pulled and persuaded"' so that judges do not have to deal with the reality to 
6.
We discuss how "the focus of sexual offender laws is to shame and humiliate those persons subject to regulation" extensively in MICHAEL L.
PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION 3 (2017).

536 U.S. 24 (2002).
8.
For the most recent critique, see David T. . offered a litany of deeply problematic factual assertions about Isex offenders' that continue to shape legal decisions to this day.").
9.
Our title comes from one of Bob Dylan's greatest songs, The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll, about the death of a country club waitress at the hands of an inebriated tobacco empire scion. It comes from a verse that importantly for our purposes talks about the sort of judicial corruption that Dylan saw in that case (in which the defendant was given a sixmonth sentence):
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which they willfully blind themselves.o The premises of judges' decisions related to the assessment of who is a sexually violent predator are built on houses of cards that could and should crumble quickly if we dispassionately examine the underlying statistics and data. A recent article critiqued the teleological way that courts interpret biologicallybased evidence in a range of criminal procedure cases so that they can end up with the result that, a priori, they want to reach. Indeed, "judges . . . , like the rest of us, are subject to an incessant media barrage of media hysteria on questions of whether sex offenders are likely to recidivate."n We believe that it is impossible to make sense of the law or the science in this volatile area of law and policy until we come to grips with this reality. Part I of this Article considers how courts rely on inaccurate statistics when deciding whether a sex offender is likely to recidivate. 12 Part I also contrasts these hiaccurate statistics with the accurate statistics and looks carefully at this misuse of statistics in the context of the McKune case and the denouement of that decision. Part II In the courtroom of honor, the judge pounded his gavel To show that all's equal and that the courts are on the level And that the strings in the books ain't pulled and persuaded And that even the nobles get properly handled.
BOB DYLAN, THE LONESOME DEATH OF HATTIE CARROLL (Columbia Records 1964) (emphasis added).
10.
See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011) ("Many criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.").
11.
Michael L. discusses how these errors have led to the inappropriate shaming and humiliation of persons enmeshed in the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA") commitment process. 13 Part 11 also explains how these errors have consequently trivialized the judicial process, noting, however, that there have been some recent cases that consider the underlying issues more seriously. Part III explores the meaning and significance of therapeutic jurisprudence in this context and seeks to expose how the errors in question violate all the precepts of therapeutic jurisprudence. We conclude with some modest suggestions for the courts and for litigators in this complex and difficult area of the law.
I.
How COURTS RELY ON INACCURATE STATISTICS
Sex offender statutes and implementing court decisions are designed to isolate, restrict, and/or remove sexual offenders from society." Strict monitoring and post-criminal sentence sanctions have been deemed necessary for two central reasons: (1) such individuals commit crimes that society has deemed to be the most heiious, 5 and (2) sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism and are highly likely to repeat offending behaviors."
13.
See This notion of a purported reality of high recidivism has been perpetuated by experts working in the field of sex offender assessment, court decisions supporting civil commitment of offenders after they have served a criminal sentence, and, most notably, the media. All three of these contributing factors are interconnected and have continuously built upon each other's misinformation and inaccurately perceived truths.
25
The media has focused significantly on the heinous and highly emotionally charged crimes of individuals such as Earl Shriner, whose assessments of dangerousness.
" 
28.
Pollak & Kubrin, supra note 4, at 60 ("Reality is socially constructed, in large part, through the media, which provides a way for dominant values in society to be articulated to the public."); id. at 64 ("With regards to emotion, newspapers focus on ideas whereas television emphasizes -feeling, appearance, mood . . . there is a retreat from distant analysis and a dive into emotional and sensory involvement."'). 
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and Order: SVU recidivism rates are near 100 percent for sex offenders. 30 The role of the media in the development of sex offender law is a base reflection of the power of fear in the creation of law and policy. By extrapolathig from the scenario of the worst case,31 we have created policies that reject valid and reliable statistics, reject science, and, instead, generate a body of statutes and court decisions based on inaccurate presumptions. For example, prior to the enactment of national sex crime registries and notification laws, there were no verifiable reports of any hicrease in sex crimes.
32 1I fact, a federally funded study showed that a decline in sexual assault cases began before the enactment of sex offender reforms. This finding would seem to indicate that, shice the pattern of decline began prior to the enactment of sex crime reforms, the laws themselves could not have affected the start of this downward pattern.
33
The judiciary is susceptible to the same moral panic as the press and the general public. The media-driven panic over sex offenders has directly influenced judicial decisions-at the trial, intermediate appellate, and Supreme Court levels-in this area of the law, especially in jurisdictions with elected judges. 34 The demonization of this population has helped create a "moral panic"
35 that has driven the passage of legislation. Yet, valid and reliable research has found this legislation to be counterproductive and engendering a more dangerous set of conditionS 3 6 and judicial decisions-all reflecting the "anger and hostility the public feels" about this population.
37
In the case of United States v. Comstock, 8 the Supreme Court's opinion reinforced the power of Congress to prevent this "dangerous" cohort of individuals from entering society. 39 Although it is impossible to know with any level of confidence whether the Justices writing for the majority were moved or influenced in any way by public sentiment, 40 there is no doubt that the majority blindly accepted the opinion that sexual predators will pose a high risk of dangerousness and that future risk can be determined." Notably, three of the five persons designated as "sexually dangerous" whose appeals were heard in the Comstock case were on charges of possession of child pornography.
2
Although child pornography is a crime that continuously harms the victim through dissemination, recent studies show an overall lower risk for reoffense. 4 3 Additionally, researchers disagree on the risk between viewing child pornography and committing a contact offense, with the general consensus that exclusive internet offenders have a low risk of recidivism. 44 In a 5-year fixed follow-up sample of 266 child pornography offenders who had some opportunity to reoffend in the community, the mean CPORT score was 1.94 (SD = 1.57, 95% CI = 1.74 -2.12, range 0-7). Eleven percent committed a new sexual offense, with 3 percent committing a new contact sexual offense against a child (17 years of age or younger) and 9 percent committing a new child pornography offense.
The valid and reliable research paints an entirely different picture from the one accepted by the general public and the media and unthinkingly endorsed by the Supreme Court .4 Contemporaneous Department of Justice statistics demonstrate that "[n]ot only do few sex offenders get rearrested for committing a new sex crime, but sex offenders are less likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any crime at all." 6 This is certainly an extremely complicated area and 
41.
Comstock, 560 U.S. at 131. Justice Alito's concurring opinion focuses upon the fears of "dangerousness" and "risk" in allowing this population to return to the community and, therefore, must support federal intervention. Citing evidence of the States' unwillingness to assume the financial burden of containing these individuals, Justice Alito deemed that the burden thus fell upon Congress to prevent these prisoners to enter the community and "present a danger [wherever] they chose to live or visit." Id. at 158 (Alito, J., concurring). outcomes can vary based on the definitions of "re-offense," the cohort studied, and the methods used in carrying out the study. Thus, the conclusions of numerous reports and studies on re-offense and dangerousness are hotly contested," but recent studies undeniably show misguidance in our general understandhig of recidivism.
1.
Since 1992, sex offenses in the U.S. have declihed by 60 percent; rape rates, too, have followed a similar trajectory. Recidivism rates for all released prisoners, not just those who committed a sexual crime, tend to range between 56.7 percent (withii one year after release) and 76.6 percent (withii five years after release 3. An early study that looked at released offenders found that the rates of recidivism are similar to those of other incarcerated offenders, with rates of reoffending for sex crimes falling around 28 percent .52 4.
Older age is generally tied to lower risk of recidivism amongst sex offenders. A 2003 report found that: "(1) age was a 'powerful determinant' of sexual arousal assessed by volumetric phallometry,5 3 and (2) sexual recidivism decreased as a linear function of age at time of release from prison (based on an analysis of 468 sex offenders released from a federal penitentiary in Ontario)."4 The authors posited that "these findings are less than surprising, given the well documented decline of bioavailable testosterone over the course of the lifespan, and the equally well documented decrease in libido in males as age increases." Disturbingly, there appears to be very little research into the efficacy of civil commitment. Other than incapacitation, there is scarce empirical evidence of its long-term benefits, and little research has explored its effectiveness on sexually violent predators. (explaining that when tracking the official records of sixty-one sex offenders who had been released during the first six years of the Washington Community Protection Act of 1990, 41 percent of the group were not rearrested at a mean follow-up of almost four years, and, of the 59 percent who were rearrested, only 28 percent had committed further sex offenses; the non-offenders could have been subjected to life sentences without parole).
53.
This is a measurement of penile blood volume change, rather than penile circumference change. Regulating, criminalizing, and sanctioning actions involving sexual activity void of sexual offending has had a complicated and rocky history within the law and courts.
7 Cases involving sex crimes can further complicate a judge's established "moral" position on sensitive issues, and court decisions are unlike any other area in our jurisprudence. 8 The judgment that precedes the adjudication of these crimes is overwhelming and steeped in fear, disgust, and a belief that the charged individual is automatically guilty and deviant. There is rampant ignorance as to the legal, societal, and psychological underpinnings of the circumstances surrounding these cases by not only the "court of public opinion" but of the highest court itself. 9 And now, for the first time, we are beginning to see some of the legal roots of these attitudes. In a recent article, Professor Ira Elhman and a colleague discussed the Supreme Court's continued reference to the "frightening and high" statistics of recidivism by sexual offenders. 
536 U.S. 24 (2002).
63.
Id. at 33 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER
2009).
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sentence: "Most untreated sex offenders released from prison go on to commit more offenses indeed, as many as 80% do." But the sentence is a bare assertion: the article contains no supporting reference for it. Nor does its author appear to have the scientific credentials that would qualify him to testify at trial as an expert on recidivism. He is a counselor, not a scholar of sex crimes or reoffense rates, and the cited article is not about recidivism statistics. It's about a counseling program for sex offenders he then ran in an Oregon prison. His unsupported assertion about the recidivism rate for untreated sex offenders was offered to contrast with his equally unsupported assertion about the lower recidivism rate for those who complete his program."
Thus, the authors conclude that "the evidence for McKune's claim that offenders have high re-offense rates (and the effectiveness of counseling programs in reducing it) was just the unsupported assertion of someone without research expertise who made his living selling such counseling programs to prisons." 7 Others have used Elhnan's reasoning to sway courts in their view of the case. In one case, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant's arguments with these words:
The problem for the defendant is that, regardless of how convincing that social science may be, "the legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to gather and evaluate data bearing on complex problems." Simply put, we are not a superlegislature.68 Const. Comment. at 508. Yet, I must cling to the belief that the persons who have been privileged to serve on our nation's highest Court will yield to the facts and give a closer look at whether our statutory scheme is rationally connected to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety and whether its terms and conditions are excessive in relation to that public safety purpose. If they do, I submit that an objective analysis will disclose that, in the current version of [the Kansas sex offender law], public safety has crossed over the line and is now a "sham or mere pretext" for imposing additional punishment on the offender>
Ellman
In spite of the existence of extensive scientific literature on sexual and violent recidivism research, myths and misconceptions continue to exist. Stunnhigly, a recent hivestigative article underscores that at least one state-California-sought to suppress research studies that showed that untreated sex offenders with all of the risk factors of committed SVPs contributed to only 6.5 percent of contact sex crimes during an almost five-year exposure in the community. that California "shut down" the study when these statistics became known."
The irrational fear over these types of crimes permeates all facets of the law-this fear affects lawyers (both prosecutors and defense counsel), legislators, and judges alike. 74 Throughout the case law, from the inception of the new generation laws until the present, myths and misconceptions continue to be voiced by the courts in making their decisions. 75 Yet, the inadequate and inaccurate response to sexual offending can be mainly attributed to the failure of public policy to create a working relationship between effective law making and sexual-violence prevention and intervention.71 This is not the end of the story. In recent years, some state and federal courts have begun to scale back restrictions on sex offenders and scrutinize the constitutionality of enacted laws. The decade or so of poking holes in the solid foundation of incorrect and unfounded beliefs surrounding sexual offending appears to have finally made an impact in the judiciary. 77 Several recent decisions, in certain jurisdictions, have thus abruptly halted the "runaway train" of sex offender legislation. 
77.
Although much groundwork has been laid in questioning misconceptions, the research of Ira Ellman and Tara Ellman that has been scarcely noted
In late 2016, the Sixth Circuit concluded in Does #1-5 v. Snyder that Michigan's sex offender registry and residency restriction law constituted ex post facto punishment." Significantly, this decision stood iii stark contrast with the judgments of other courts that have largely rejected various constitutional challenges to specialized sex offender laws and policies." In Does #1-5, the plaintiffs, who filed anonymously, argued that various provisions of Michigan's Sex Offenders Registration Act ("SORA") were "unconstitutionally vague, should not be enforced under strict liability standards, infringed upon freedom of speech, and hobbled their rights to parent, work, and travel." 0 The Sixth Circuit found the retroactive application of SORA to be punitive and therefore unconstitutional." In conducting the rationalityexcessiveness test, the court considered the legislature's stated goals of promoting public safety and reducing recidivism.
8 2 The court found little to no evidence on the record to support the claim that SORA served either of these goals.
3 Considering the stated goal of reducing recidivism, the court found the evidence in the record demonstrated SORA had, at best, no impact on recidivism." In fact, the court found evidence in the record that the law may actually increase the risk of recidivism." Compounding the court's unwillingness to uphold SORA was the State of Michigan's failure to so much as analyze recidivism rates in the state, despite having the necessary data to do so. 6 As for public safety, the court found that the record disclosed no relationship between SORA's registration requirements and public safety whatsoever. Upholding SORA, the court found, would amount to writing a blank check to the legislature to pass whatever laws it wished."
Of note in the Does #1-5 case was the unique approach that the Sixth Circuit took by discussing "scientific evidence that refutes and discussed in the recent case law must be acknowledged. moralized judgments about sex offenders, specifically that they pose a unique and substantial risk of recidivism."" Melissa Hamilton, in her important article highlighting these points, identified the significance of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning and analysis. Hamilton focused on the implication of the court's suspicion of the long-held belief that sex offender recidivism was "frightening and high" and that it was not clearly supported by the scientific evidence.
9
Other courts have followed the Sixth Circuit's lead in rejecting "frightening and high statistics" as the bases for decisions in sex offender cases. By way of example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 0 held that the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), or Megan's Law IV, registration requirements were "punishment," thus violating the ex post facto clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions." Such requirements could not be applied retroactively, the court found, as the individual had already been sentenced for the predicate crime.
Elsewhere whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: (1) has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; (2) imposes an "affirmative disability or restraint;" (3) "promote[s] the traditional aims of punishment;" (4) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; (5) is excessive with respect to this purpose; (6) "comes into play only on a finding of scienter" and (7) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime." 372 U.S. at 168 69.
95.
Millard, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1228.
96.
Id. at 1229 (noting that in Smith, "the Court expressly noted that the law under consideration did not have an in-person reporting requirement, and further stated that the record contained 'no evidence that the Act has led to substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that would not have otherwise occurred' (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 100)).
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Judge Matsch held that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the state's SORNA requirements punitive in their effects and, therefore, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
7
In Millard, persons who were registered under the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act 8 brought a § 1983 civil action and claimed that the Colorado SORA violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In finding that the plaintiffs' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated," the court looked at the criminal history of registrants David Millard, Eugene Knight, and Arturo Vega, detailing the crimes that placed them on the registry and focusing on the resulthig hardships of behig classified as a "sex offender" in the community.
David Millard was forced to change residences and, as a result of highly detailed hiformation published on the internet, constantly feared that his sex offender status would be discovered and result in his loss of employment .oo Eugene Knight was a full-time father who received a letter from his child's school that identified him as a sex offender and barred him from entering school grounds. The court noted that "[t]his exclusion from his children's school is solely because he is a registered sex offender. Neither DPS nor anyone else had ever accused Mr. Knight of any conduct allegedly disrupting school operations or creating an unsafe or threatening school environment."o Arturo Vega, who was adjudicated as a juvenile offender at age fifteen for conduct occurring when he was thirteen years old, detailed the difficulty experienced in his employment as a direct consequence of his presence on the sex offender registry.
102 Because Mr. Vega was a juvenile offender, he made prior attempts to be removed from the registry. During the prior proceedings for removal, the magistrates improperly placed the burden on Mr. Vega to prove that another offense was not likely. 103 In addition to reviewhig the personal hardships faced by the plaintiffs, the Millard court took note of a recent shift in the Supreme Court's conceptualization of privacy and access to the hiternet by citiig the 2017 case of Packingham v. North Carolina.
15
Although Packingham had dealt with First Amendment violations of registered sex offenders, it contained a foreshadowhig statement that applied directly to the issue in Millard. 16 In his majority opinion in Packingham, Justice Kennedy highlighted "the troublhig fact that the law imposes severe restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system," but noted that this was not an issue currently before the This ongoing imposition of a known and uncontrollable risk of public abuse of information from the sex offender registry, in the absence of any link to an objective risk to the public posed by each individual sex offender, has resulted in and continues to threaten Plaintiffs with punishment disproportionate to the offenses they committed. Where the nature of such punishment is by its nature uncertain and unpredictable, the state cannot assure that it will ever be proportionate to the offense. SORA as applied to these Plaintiffs therefore violates the Eighth Amendment."o0
The decisions in Does #1-5, Muniz, and Millard represent significant evidence of a judicial shift-in those three jurisdictions-in evaluating the constitutionality of SORA as applied. 
MSOP). In
Karsjens, multiple claims were brought under a § 1983 class action asserthig that the MSOP was punitive in effect."' The class action alleged, among other things, that the MSOP failed to provide treatment and denied the right to be free of inhumane treatment. 112 The court displayed its assurance that plaintiffs would likely succeed if, through discovery, they can demonstrate that the commitment scheme is systematically applied in a way that indefinitely commits individuals who are no longer dangerous.
113
Judge Frank took seriously the plaintiffs' claims, stathig that the program in Mhinesota is "clearly broken," and might be "one of the most draconian sex offender programs in existence."" The court observed as follows:
At the center of Plaintiffs' challenge to the Minnesota sex offender commitment scheme is the allegation that a commitment to MSOP essentially amounts to life-long confinement, equivalent to a lifetime of criminal incarceration in a facility resembling, and run like, a medium to high security prison. Under such conditions, and assuming the allegations in the Complaint to be true, it appears that MSOP may very well be serving the constitutionally impermissible purposes of retribution and deterrence.
1
A year later, on February 2, 2015, the same court denied a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment by defendants and reiterated that, "[n]ot only does this case address the rights of those populations in our society that are most disliked and feared (and a number of individuals who are vulnerable), but it also heightens the concerns and fears of the public at large." 1 6 In a noteworthy footnote, the court acknowledged and refused to dismiss the Plaintiffs' assertion that:
Defendants were "aware of the failure to progress Plaintiffs and [c]lass members through the different treatment phases to the point that they could be conditionally or unconditionally released" and that "the MSOP treatment program as implemented had only conditionally released a single person and Even within this small segment of the opinion, the court created history by recognizing and proclaiming the above long-held suspicion and concern by individuals who question the basis for sex offender civil commitment. In further momentous recognition, the court stressed the underlying politics of this area of the law:
Moreover, the record before the Court highlights both the best and the worst of the three branches of our government. At a minimum, the evidence has shown that, to date, the executive and legislative branches in Minnesota have let politics, rather than the rule of law and the rights of "all" of their citizens guide their decisions. In a situation such as this, the federal court may have to step in to protect the rights of Plaintiffs."
Any optimism inspired by Judge Frank's decision ended with the decision of the Eighth Circuit, which, in Karsjens v. Piper," reversed Judge Frank's opinion and found no substantive due process violation.
The Eighth Circuit explained that although civil commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty, the Supreme Court has never held that individuals "who pose a significant danger to themselves or others possess a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint. "121 In reviewing the recent cases that impact sex offender laws, it is noteworthy to consider how the denial of the petitions for certiorari by the Supreme Court in both the Karsjens case and the Does #1-5 case affect the dialogue about a potential shift of opinion in the highest court 123 In denying the petition for certiorari in Karsjens, 124 the Supreme Court left the Eighth Circuit rulhig to stand as precedent in the sex offender civil commitment system withii Minesota and other states in that Circuit.
Theoretically, the Court's refusal to review the Karsjens case could be viewed as an abdication of constitutional oversight of sex offender commitment laws. One can question whether the Court was merely scaling back its federal oversight in these state issues or whether the Court is not quite ready to fully confront the "frightenhig and high" mythology that was exposed in Professor Elman's article. 125 But, either way, in both circumstances, had the Court granted certiorari, it would have been forced to confront recent developments withii the scientific community, in some manner or fashion, in order to effectively evaluate the constitutional issues raised. This entry into the "scientific world" is a "can of worms" that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to open fully; yet in this especially unique area of the law, it is impossible to divorce the science from the legislation in the determination of constitutionality.
126
II. ON SHAME AND HUMILIATION
Shame and humiliation are often felt in combination with one another; it is necessary to consider both in detail in order to seek to understand how these emotions are generated as a direct result of our treatment of individuals that have been labeled as sexual offenders. But we must honestly and thoroughly investigate the reasons supporting the enactment of such legislation while scrutinizing legislative usage of medical and scientific testimony to support sex-offender commitments. Before we could even begin to address the problems surrounding the science, however, we would need to re-consider the laws and foundations on which they were based.
Id. (citations omitted).
that the vast majority of sex offenders self-report being humiliated on a daily basis. 13 4 Elsewhere, with a colleague, Michael L. Perlin wrote:
The use of humiliation techniques, whether done in overt or passive ways, violates rights to due process, privacy, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. By marginalizing the rights of those who are shamed and humiliated, such individuals are treated as less than human.
13 5
Think about this in the context of criminal punishments-though we adhere to the fantasy that SVPA commitments are not criminal, per the pretextual decision of Kansas v. Hendricks, 13 6 there is no question that they are. 137 Punishment was originally needed to 'remove the evil spirit thought to cause an individual to transgress against society.' It is a ritualistic device conveying 'moral condemnation,' 'inflicting humiliation,' and dramatizing evil through a public 'degradation ceremony. " '138 In a parallel context, consider Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Sandin v. Conner, in which she argued that the stigma of punitive segregation "should suffice to qualify such confinement as liberty depriving for purposes of Due Process Clause protection."
13 9 There is no of describing a person with mental illness as violent in 1996 were 2.3 times the odds of describing a person with mental illness as violent in 1950.""' In short, the statistical errors on which courts rely-abetted by misleading media depictionS 1 42 -create an environment in which shame and humiliation fester and through which the judicial process is trivialized, just as we regularly trivialize both valid and reliable behavior research when it is dissonant with our false "ordinary common sense" 143 and the experiences of persons with mental illness. 144 There is no question left "on the table" about the law's power to shame and humiliate.
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III. How THIS VIOLATES THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE"'
Therapeutic jurisprudence looks at the impact of law on people's lives,"' focusing upon the law's influence on "emotional life and psychological well-being." 4 8 It seeks "to determine whether legal rules and procedures or lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles."' Per Professor David Wexler, the tension in this inquiry must be resolved in this manner: "The law's use of 'mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge[] upon justice concerns." '150 1I a series of articles and a book, we have assessed various aspects of sex offender policies through the prism of therapeutic jurisprudence.
1 1 In one of those articles, we concluded that we believe that it is only through the use of therapeutic jurisprudence that we can best diminish the shaming and humiliating aspects of these processes.
1 5 2
We know that nothing so clearly violates "the dignity of persons as treatment that demeans or humiliates them" as shaming. 1 5 3 To be consistent with therapeutic jurisprudence principles we must, rather, focus on reintegrating sex offenders into society and promoting sex offenders' self-respect and dignity while fostering family and community relationships." In an earlier article focusing on the right to and quality of counsel at SVPA hearings, we made this point:
Those very variables that make SVPA litigation different the need for lawyers to be able to understand, contextualize and effectively cross-examine experts on specific actuarial tests; the need for lawyers to recognize when an expert witness is needed to rebut the state's position, and the need for lawyers to understand the potential extent of jury bias (making the ideal of a fair trial even more difficult to accomplish) all demand a [therapeutic jurisprudence] approach to representation and to litigation. Certainly, the issues we raise here-the ways that courts use improper statistics and unverified data, misunderstand or ignore the significance of valid and reliable research, and fall prey to the perniciousness of the vividness heuristic, a cognitive-simplifying device through which a "single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be "therapeutic jurisprudence." In 1975, in one of Michael L. Perlin's first articles, about the use of psychiatric testimony in criminal cases, he said this in discussing what he characterized as "quirky" cases:
[Imagine] a defendant is charged with a minor offense (such as petty larceny) which nevertheless raises a question as to the possible existence of a psychiatric problem (e.g., where the defendant steals only pantyhose), a psychiatric examination may serve to indicate the real problem (if, in fact, one is present) and to direct the defendant towards a suitable therapeutic treatment program. 
